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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COIHIENTS
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Prosecutor's Tears Prejudicial Error-In a
prosecution for the murder of a policeman, the
State's Attorney wept during his closing argument
before the jury saying, "I am not ashamed of what
I am doing now, believe me. I knew the dead man."
The defendant was convicted, the jury imposed
the death penalty, and on motion for new trial,
defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's
weeping was prejudicial error. The prosecutor did
not deny that he wept, but said that he did not
recall doing so. The trial court denied the motion
for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Illinois,
two Justices dissenting, reversed, holding that
although it was satisfied that proof of the defend-
ant's guilt was "clear" and the death penalty
"may well" have been warranted, it would reverse
a guilty verdict for prejudicial error in those
cases where the jury has discretion to fix the
punishment. People v. Dukes, 146 N.E. 2d 14 (Ill.
1957).
It was not disputed that the prosecutor knew
the murdered policeman, but the court felt that
even though he was "personally grieved", and
assuming that his motive in weeping was "inno-
cent", the effect on the jury was so improper and
prejudicial that the defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial was materially damaged. Though
other prejudicial errors were committed during
the course of the trial, the court's severe condem-
nation of this act implied that the prosecutor's
weeping in front of the jury, even standing alone,
would be grounds for reversal though proof of
guilt is clear.
Double Jeopardy to Retry Accused for First
Degree Murder After Reversal of Conviction in
Second Degree-The defendant was indicted by a
Washington, D.C. grand jury for arson and first
degree murder resulting from the arson. At the
trial, the judge instructed the jury, with respect
to the second count, that it could find the defend-
ant guilty of either first or second degree murder.
The jury found the defendant guilty of arson and
also of second degree murder. The verdict was
silent on the charge of first degree murder. After
sentence on both convictions was imposed, the
defendant appealed and the United States Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction of second dtgree
murder on the grounds that it was not supported
by evidence and remanded the case for a new trial.
On retrial, the defendant was again tried for first
degree murder under the original indictment, and
his defense of double jeopardy was rejected by the
trial judge. He was then found guilty, by a new
jury, of first degree murder, and the conviction
was affirmed. The United States Supreme Court,
however, four justices dissenting, reversed and
held that the retrial of the defendant for first
degree murder, after his conviction of second
degree murder has been reversed and remanded,
constituted double jeopardy. Green v. United
States, 78 S.Ct. 221 (1957).
The prosecution's basic contention was that the
trial on remand, after the defendant's initial con-
viction has been reversed, should proceed as though
the defendant were being tried for the first time.
In rejecting the contention, the Court said that
this would violate the fifth amendment to the
Constitution which declares that no person shall
"... be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.. . ." The Court
stated that the philotophy underlying the amend-
ment "is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty." Therefore, a
verdict of acquittal is final and the accused can no
longer be subject to prosecution on that charge. A
second trial would be barred. In noting that "a
defendant can be tried a second time for an offense
when his prior conviction for the same offense has
been set aside on appeal," the Court said that such
was not the situation in the instant case. In this
case, the Court said, the jury could have found the
defendant guilty of either first or second degree
murder. Since it returned a verdict of second
degree murder and was silent with regard to the
charge of first degree murder; the Court found an
implicit acquittal on the latter. This concept is
extended, according to the Court, to the situation
where an accused has been placed in jeopardy, by
being brought before a jury, and the jury is dis-
charged without his consent and this had occured
here. Consequently, both the acquittal on the
charge of first degree murder and the discharge
of the jury operated to bar any future trial on the
charge of first degree murder. The Court also said
that the defendant's appeal of the conviction on
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Z-econdl degree murder did not constitute a waiver
of the constitutional guarantees of the fifth
amendment. "When a man has been convicted of
second degree murder and given a long term of
imprisonment," the Court stated, "it is wholly
fictional to say that he 'chooses' to forego his
constitutional defense of former jeopardy on a
charge of murder in the first degree in order to
secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of the
lesser offense."
The dissent asserted that the majority opinion
was not only contrary to the historical develop-
ment of the principle of double jeopardy, but also
contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions. It
commented that the approach of the majority
"misconceives the purpose of the double jeopardy
provision, and without warrant from the Consti-
tution makes an absolute of the interests of the
accused in disregard of the interests of society."
Since the question was decided as one involving
the Constitution, and not one within the Court's
supervisory jurisdiction over federal criminal
procedure, Congress is preempted from affecting
the majority's decision, according to the dissent.
The dissent also pointed out that the Court has
held "that a State could permit the prosecution
to appeal a conviction of second degree murder and
on retrial secure a conviction of first degree murder
without violating any 'fundamental principle of
liberty and justice."' Thus, argued the dissent,
even though the above holding pertained to con-
duct permissible under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, it should not be
ignored in formulating conduct permissible under
the fifth amendment. The dissent noted that a
substantial number of states allow what the major-
ity has condemned in this case.
Lack of Notice Requirement Renders Felon
Registration Law Unconstitutional-The defend-
ant, who had lived in Los Angeles for over seven
years, was charged with violating a local municipal
registration ordinance. The ordinance required
any person convicted of an offense punishable as a
felony in California, or, if convicted in another
state of an offense that would have been punished
as a felony had it been committed in California,
to register with the Chief of Police. The defendant
had not registered although she had been con-
victed of a crime punishable as a felony in Califor-
nia. At the time of the trial, the defendant asserted
that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but this
contention was rejected and she was found guilty.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the conviction and held, four justices dissenting,
that the ordinance violated the Due Process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment in
that it applies "to a person who has no actual
knowledge of his duty to register, and where no
showing is made of the probability of such knowl-
edge." Lambert v. California, 78 S.Ct. 240 (1957).
The Court noted that the terms of the ordinance
required no element of willfulness, nor was such a
requirement read into it by the California courts.
The conduct that the ordinance condemned, ac-
cording to the Court, was "wholly passive-mere
failure to register." The Court stated that although
the rule that ignorance of the law will not excuse is
well settled, this rule is limited by the requirements
of Due Process, which includes the requirement of
notice. This requirement is "appropriate where a
person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrong-
doing, is brought to the bar of justice for condem-
nation in a criminal case." The Court stated that
the only test in determining a violation of the
ordinance was mere presence in the city. The
ordinance, commented the Court, was merely a
device for the convenience of the law enforcement
agencies that desired a list of felons residing in the
city. The Court also pointed out that the defend-
ant, once informed of the ordinance, was not al-
lowed an opportunity to register, but charged
with its violation and tried. Before a conviction
under such an ordinance can stand, the Court said,
"actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof
of the probability of such knowledge and subse-
quent failure to comply are necessary."
The dissent indicated that it felt the motivating
factor behind the majority's opinion was the hard-
ship presented by the instant case, in that she had
to pay a $250 fine and was put on probation for
three years. The dissent stated that the ordinance
was a proper exercise of local police power and
similar regulatory measures were innumerable and
had been sustained.
Reading of Multiple Indictments Before Pros-
pective Jurors Held Error-The defendant was
indicted by a grand jury on charges of rape,
molesting a minor and kidnapping. At the time of
formal arraignment, the solicitor-general charged
the defendant with the offense of rape in open
court before the jury had been empaneled, but in
the presence of the jurors who were subsequently
to try him. After the defendant pleaded not guilty,
he was also charged with the other two offenses.
Defense counsel moved for a continuance on the
ground that asserting all three charges in the
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presence of prospective jurors was prejudicial and
harmful. The motion was denied and the trial
judge did not instruct the jury to disregard the
other indictments against the defendant. In
reversing the defendant's conviction for rape, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the defend-
ant's plea of not guilty to the first indictment
formed an issue to be tried, and that it was the
duty of the State not to announce to prospective
jurors that other indictments against the defendant
were outstanding. Sides v. State, 99 S.E. 2d 884
(Ga. 1957).
The court conceded that an indictment is a mere
charge or accusation by a grand jury and no evi-
dence of guilt, but looked to the effect upon the
prospective jurors of their hearing repeated
charges asserted against the defendant. The court
concluded that knowledge of the indictments
other than the one for which the defendant was
being tried would tend to impress upon the jury
that the defendant is more likely to be guilty in the
case under consideration, and thus deprive the
defendant of the right to enter upon trial with the
presumption of his innocence in his favor. Since
the defendant received the death penalty, the
court said that the error could not be considered
harmless.
Testimony of Handwriting Expert Sole Basis for
Conviction-The police, while investigating a
report that the defendant's wife had disappeared,
found that the certificate of ownership of her car
had been assigned to one John Bowman. The car
was found three or four blocks from the defendant's
home, but no trace of a John Bowman could be
found. After suspecting that the certificate had
been forged, the police invited the defendant to
submit samples of his handwriting, which he did
voluntarily. These samples and other authenti-
cated specimens of the defendant's handwriting
and that of his wife were submitted to a hand-
writing expert. At the trial of the defendant for
alleged forgery of the certificate of ownership, the
expert testified that after studying all the speci-
mens of handwriting, he was of the opinion that
the writing on the certificate was that of the
defendent and not his wife. No other proof of the
defendant's alleged forgery was submitted, nor
any direct proof that the defendant had exercised
possession or dominion over the car or the certifi-
cate. The defendant's wife did not testify because
she could not be found. The jury found the defend-
ant guilty of forgery with intent to prejudice,
injure, damage and defraud. The Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversing on other
grounds, held that a jury could properly find the
defendant guilty of a crime requiring specific
intent where the evidence was wholly circumstan-
tial and based solely on the testimony of a hand-
writing expert. State v. Btdna, 134 A. 2d 738 (N.J.
1957).
The court noted that the opinion of a hand-
writing expert is no longer considered a low order
of evidence to be accorded little evidential weight.
The court stated, however, that the expert's
opinion is on the same plane as other evidence,
and the weight given it will depend on the clearness
with which the expert demonstrates the basis for
his opinion. Thus, since the jury believed the
testimony of the handwriting expert, and the act
of forgery itself is sufficient to imply an intent to
defraud in the context of the circumstances of this
particular case, the court said there was adequate
basis for conviction of a crime requiring specific
intent.
First Judicial Interpretation Of Federal Narcotic
Registration Law-The statute, 18 U.S.C.A.
§1407, states the following:
§1407. Border crossings-narcotic addicts and vio-
lators.
(a) In order further to give effect to the obligations
of the United States pursuant to the Hague convention
of 1912, proclaimed as a treaty on March 3, 1915 (38
Stat. 1912), and the limitation convention of 1931,
proclaimed as a treaty on July 10, 1933 (48 Stat. 1571),
and in order to facilitate more effective control of the
international traffic in narcotic drugs, and to prevent
the spread of drug addiction, no citizen of the United
States who is addicted to or uses narcotic drugs, as
defined in section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended (except aperson using such nar-
cotic drugs as a result of sickness or accident or injury
and to whom such narcotic drug is being furnished,
prescribed, or administered in good faith by a duly
licensed physician in attendance upon such person, in
the course of his professional practice) or who has been
convicted of a violation of any of the narcotic or mari-
huana laws of the United States, or of any State thereof,
the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than
one year, shall deptrt from or enter into or attempt to
depart from or enter into the United States, unless such
person registers, under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
with a customs official, agent, or employee at a point
of entry or a border customs station. Unless otherwise
prohibited by law or Federal regulation such customs
official, agent, or employee shall issue a certificate to
any such person departing from the United States;
and such person shall, upon returning to the United
States, surrender such certificate to the customs official,
agent, or employee present at the port of entry or border
customs station.
(b) Whoever violates any of the provisions of this
section shall be punished for each such violation by a
fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than three years, or both.
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The defendant, a citizen of the United States,
returned to this country without registering with
customs officials, as required by the Act. At her
trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the action,
attacking the government's interpretation of, and
the constitutionality of, the Act. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of
California denied the defendant's motion, held
the Act constitutional, and found her guilty.
United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (Cal.
1957).
This case was a matter of first impression con-
cerning the registration provisions of the Narcotic
Control Act of 1956. Three major arguments were
advanced by the defendant: (1) the statute was
unconstitutional because the registration was an
admission of narcotic addiction and, since no
immunity clause is included, a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the defend-
ant's right to travel, guaranteed by the fifth
amendment, was impaired; and (3) where a defend-
ant had been convicted of a violation of a state
narcotic law and sentenced for a term of less than
one year he did not come within the terms of the
Act.
In answering the defendant's contention that a
registration would violate her constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, the court
noted that since there is no requirement that the
registrant state where or when he had become ad-
dicted to narcotics, and since "a necessary element
of a narcotics crime is an allegation that the offense
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court," there would be no basis for an indictment
on the strength of the information disclosed by the
registration. In addition, the court said that both
federal and state prosecutions for the prior use of
narcotics might be barred by a statute of limita-
tions. Also, with respect to state prosecutions, the
court applied the well known rule that the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment extends only to
possible prosecutions under federal law, and does
not take congnizance of a possible prosecution
under the laws of another jurisdiction. The court
noted that, even assuming the privilege applied,
an exception to the scope of the fifth amendment
found in such cases as Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948), probably applied. In that
case, the Court held that, "... the privilege which
exists as to private papers cannot be maintained
in relation to records required by law to be kept in
order that there may be suitable information of
transactions which are the appropriate subjects
of governmental regulation...."
A related argument concerned the possibility
that the information disclosed by the registration,
while not direct evidence, might become a "link
in the chain" of evidence used in future narcotic
prosecutions and thus would also fall under the pro-
tection of the privilege against self-incrimination
according to the rule of Hojqman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951). The court pointed out, how-
ever, that all the cases concerned with the "link
in the chain" argument had to do with forced
testimony before courts or grand juries, whereas
in the instant case the defendant was not required
to register unless she chose voluntarily to leave
or enter the United States. This answer is not
valid, however, if the right to travel, an "attribute
of personal liberty ... secured by the ... Consti-
tution," Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), is
an absolute right. But the court held that, like
free speech, the right to travel "must yield to the
delicate balancing of interest, public and private,"
and is thus not an absolute right. If the defendant,
not having an absolute constitutional right to
travel, chose to leave or enter the country, it was
not "a violation of due process under the Fifth
Amendment to require that (she) ... register
before crossing the international boundary."
The defendant's last argument concerned the
interpretation to be given that seciton of the Act
which provided that" . . . no citizen of the United
States... who has been convicted of a violation of
any of the narcotic or marihuana laws of the
United States, or of any State thereof, the penalty
for which is imprisonment for more than one year,
shall depart... ," etc. (Emphasis added.) Defend-
ant argued that if a person had been convicted for
a violation of a narcotic law, and has been sen-
tenced for a term of less than a year, the provisions
of the Act did not apply to him. The court refused
to adopt this construction of the statute which,
the court said, confused the punishment actually
imposed in any given case with the penalty which
could have been imposed. Thus, a person con-
victed of a narcotic violation under a statute
which imposed a penalty of up to five years impris-
onment is included in the provision of the Act
even though the actual sentence upon him was for
less than a year.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police
Science Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 97-100).
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